This article first appeared in Philosophy Now

Precise definitions of what make a state secular vary but three aspects are common. Firstly, a secular state is one in which there is separation of religious institutions from the institutions of the state and no domination of one by the other. Secondly, a secular state seeks to maximise freedom of thought, conscience, and religion for all, with everyone free to change their beliefs and manifest their beliefs within the limits of public order and the rights of others. Finally, on grounds of their religion or non-religious worldview, the state treats everyone equally and does not discriminate against or privilege individuals on these grounds.

Almost a third of states in the world are de jure secular in their constitutions and many more are de facto secular even if constitutionally religious, deriving their authority in practice not from their vestigial religious establishments but from democratic participation. Even more states – over 90% of them – give constitutional protection to at least one aspect of secularism in that they contain a legal guarantee freedom of religion or belief. If a state is going to take its constitutional secularism seriously, what might that mean for moral education in its state education system?

Controversy related to education has been a feature of secularism since the beginning. Historically, official secularism coincided with the construction of many state school systems, when education moved from being the preserve of parents and informal communities (often religious) to being the concern of a class of trained specialists funded by the public. In many states today there are mixed systems, with schools partly secularised (in that, for example, they admit children of all backgrounds and do not discriminate on religious grounds) and partly not. In many states, the part that is not secularised is the part of the curriculum that seeks to deal with moral development. This is often taught either through a mono-religious or multi-religious framework.

Given the first aspect of secularism outlined above it is obvious that the state system of a country like Iran or Ireland, where the school curriculum is overwhelmingly dominated by one particular religion, is unsuitable for a secular state. Here the curriculum is a tool of religious instruction whatever else it may be and one particular favoured religious organisation has active involvement in the life and structure of the state’s schools. Some secularists, however, believe that there are some models of state-provided confessional religious moral development which might be legitimate.

What if all religious organisations are given the same participation in state schools as each other? If religious organisations are allowed to run separate confessional classes in state schools as they do in Belgium, or run separate state schools as in England, wouldn’t this equal treatment be consistent with secularism as defined? To make it fair, provision could be made in proportion to their followers or in proportion to the number of parents that followed each religion. No one religion would be dominating the state institutions unfairly and everyone would be treated equally without discrimination.

The first obvious objection is that many parents have non-religious worldviews (in some societies, most parents) and so the system would still be unfair. But perhaps we could take care of that. Humanist organisations could also be involved to cater for the non-religious as they are in the Netherlands and parts of Germany. In these countries, as in Belgium, there are secularists who would defend such a system. Still, even if we could take care of the non-religious within a comprehensive system and so guarantee fairness to these parents, there are good reasons to think that such a system would still not end up being compatible with secularism.

The first reason is that such a system in the real world does not allow for changing patterns of belief and affiliation. In the nature of things it cannot react promptly to such changes and so over time privileges those religions or beliefs that are strong at the time the system is initiated. It provides them with recognition and resources and protects them from the effects of loss of popularity while making it difficult for new religions or worldviews to grow and gain recognition, inhibiting freedom of belief and equal treatment.

Secondly, no state would be able to run such a system fairly. There are so many denominations of Christianity alone that providing a whole school (or even a regular separate class in a shared school) for every one of them in every place would be impossible. Even more challenging, although people often think of religions as homogenous (‘Catholics think this’, ‘Buddhists think that’), the reality is that individuals are not so consistent. One person may identify as a Catholic but believe in reincarnation and not think that contraception is sinful. She may be married to someone who identifies as a Muslim but sympathizes in some of his beliefs with some aspects of pantheism and at home keeps Christmas because of his own missed parentage and upbringing. Belief, identity, and practice are so individual that to provide a school that catered for each parental situation without discrimination would be impossible. 

Thirdly, it is not right to focus solely on parents – children’s interests are as much the concern of secularism. The right of children to freedom of religion or belief (at least in line with their developing capacity) would suggest at a minimum that the education system provided by the state should be one free of religious assumptions on contested questions like the basis of morality or the purpose of life and certainly that it should not enforce religious practices. Going further, if state secularism really seeks to protect freedom of conscience, we could also argue that the state system should equip children with the skills and experience and ability to choose. The secular state school should teach about religions and non-religious worldviews in an objective, fair, and balanced way, allowing no confessional instruction and actively seeking to equip children with the critical skills needed to make up their own minds.

This is the thinking behind the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1989, Article 13 of which declares:

The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of the child’s choice.

Article 14 of the Convention says that states, ‘shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion’ and that parents can ‘provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child,’ but it does not say that the state has an obligation to provide this on the parents’ behalf.

Finally, we come to the interests of the state itself. Secularism accepts that individual freedom of religion or belief may be limited to protect the rights of others or in the interests of public order. The state’s interest in social cohesion and equal citizenship comes into play here. The state can be argued to have a legitimate interest in ensuring that children who will be citizens together learn with and from each other from an early age to develop the skills and habits and attitudes of living together in a democratic society.

In light of all this, the secular state is justified in doing two things. Firstly, in its own pragmatic interests to secure social peace it may legitimately inculcate certain minimum basic and essential moral values necessary for life in society. Secondly, it may teach about a range of religious and non-religious approaches to life in an objective, fair, and balanced way. There are good secular reasons for this latter learning: religions and humanism have had significant impact on human society and culture and so constitute a necessary part of a full education; as traditions they contain insights from which young people may learn; and they do constitute the actual worldviews of the child’s fellow citizens, of whom s/he should acquire some knowledge to improve mutual understanding.

There will always be individual parents who plead their conscience and say that their children should not receive divergent moral education from that in the home, but in states that take seriously the principles of fairness and freedom – for children no less than anyone else – this constraint on parental control is amply justified.